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Media coverage of monetary policy actions is a central channel of a central bank’s 
communication with the wider public, and thus an important factor for its credibility 
and policy effectiveness. This paper analyses the coverage which ECB monetary 
policy decisions receive in the print media, and the determinants of its extent and of 
its favorableness. We find that that the press critically discusses the ECB’s policy 
decisions in the context of prior market expectations and of the inflation 
environment, and that the media’s coverage of decisions is generally highly 
responsive to ECB communication – in particular its Press Conference on meeting 
days. However, the paper also finds clear limitations in this regard, thus underlining 
the critical monitoring role assumed by the media. 
 
JEL No.: E52, E58 
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Communication is an important part of the process of conducting monetary policy. 
Central banks have direct control only over a single interest rate, usually the overnight 
rate, while they wish to influence asset prices and interest rates at all maturities in 
order to achieve their aims. Effective communication as much as credible policy 
actions are of fundamental importance for achieving these objectives. For central bank 
communication to be effective, it is important that it is disseminated to the general 
public, whose inflation expectations eventually feed into the actual evolution of 
inflation, e.g. through corresponding wage claims and savings, investment and 
consumption decisions, and thus determine whether a central bank is able to achieve 
its policy objectives.  
 
This paper analyses how the media, specifically the printed press, report about the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). One element is the extent of 
the media coverage, as more extensive reporting in general allows a central bank to 
reach and to disseminate information to a wider audience. Another element relates to 
the favorableness with which the ECB’s monetary policy decision is discussed (a 
proxy for how well the reasons for a decision are understood  and the decision 
therefore finds the consent of the media), since a positive reporting is an important 
factor influencing its credibility and thus ultimately its policy effectiveness. The 
analysis focuses on the press reporting in response to the Press Conference on the 
days of the rate-setting meetings of the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing 
Council.  
 
The paper uses a novel dataset that contains quantitative information both on the 
extent and on the favorableness of the reporting of ECB monetary policy decisions, 
reaching back to 1999 and covering 57 international and national newspapers. As a 
first step, the paper shows that there is a clear mapping between favorableness and the 
extent of press coverage: the stronger the opinions expressed, the more is reported in 
the print media. Additionally, there is an asymmetry in the reporting as critical views 
are allocated more space in the newspapers than positive ones. Accordingly, it is 
important for the ECB to explain its decisions well, as particularly those decisions that 
are poorly understood are reported on more extensively  
 
The main part of the paper analyses the determinants of the extent and the 
favorableness of media reporting of ECB decisions. In particular, we find that the 
press critically discusses the ECB’s policy decisions in the context of prior market 
expectations and of the inflation environment. If a given policy decision comes as a 
surprise for markets, the tone of the reports is generally more negative. Similarly, the 
current decisions are discussed less favorably if the most recent euro area inflation 
figures exceed 2%, the ECB’s definition of price stability. These findings suggest that 
the media assumes a monitoring role, whereby it evaluates the performance of the 
independent central bank.  
 
From a policy perspective, an important question is how central bank communication 
affects understanding and acceptance of a given policy decision, and whether this is 
reflected in improved favorableness and/or increased media coverage. We find both to 
be responsive to ECB communication, through the press conference as well as 
through statements in the inter-meeting period. The empirical results show that in 
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the size of financial market reactions during the press conference, though keeping in 
mind that not all relevant information necessarily moves markets) imply a better 
understanding of a given decision by the public, which is reflected in more favorable 
press reports. Moreover, we find that decisions that have been accompanied by a 
relatively large number of statements by the ECB president, and to a lesser extent by 
other committee members, in the preceding inter-meeting period receive a 
significantly more extensive a well as more positive coverage. 
 
Both of these findings suggest that media reports are responsive to efforts by the ECB 
to explain the motivation behind a given decision. This is in particular the case for 
relatively surprising decisions, which are normally reported upon in a rather critical 
fashion. A provision of substantial information during the Press Conference in the 
aftermath of such a decision implies a better acceptance by the public, which is 
mirrored in more positive press reporting. However, there also appear clear cases 
where the press is unresponsive to the provision of information in its assessment of 
ECB decisions. For instance, we find that the media reporting of ECB policy 
decisions is always more negative in tone when inflation is relatively high, even when 
communication is intense and the information content of press conferences is high 
 
In relation to this, we also find that the release of special information and a number of 
special events during the press conferences help a better perception of policy 
decisions, and consequently enhance the favorableness of reporting. In the years from 
1999-2002, the ECB used to announce the outcome of its review of the reference 
value for M3 growth on the occasion of the December press conference; more 
recently, the ECB has started to release inflation and output growth projections on a 
quarterly basis during the press conference. In both cases, favorableness of the 
newspaper reports is found to be significantly improved. In addition, the ECB’s 
tradition of holding Governing Council meetings with subsequent press conferences 
outside Frankfurt twice a year appears to increase awareness of the public in the 
visited country, as newspaper reports in these countries turn substantially more 
favorable and significantly expand the coverage of ECB press conference. 
 
Finally, looking into the national dimension of newspaper coverage, we find that there 
is basically no role for national biases in the tone of the discussion: national media 
coverage intensifies if national inflation deviates relatively strongly from the euro 
area figures; however, the favorableness of the coverage is unaffected. One 
interpretation of this finding is that national media explain more extensively why a 
given monetary policy decision has been taken, without judging it from a purely 
national viewpoint. As such, the national media may play an important role in 
transmitting the ECB’s policy intentions to their national audiences, and may 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Communication is an important part of the process of conducting monetary policy. Central 
banks have direct control only over a single interest rate, usually the overnight rate, while they 
may attempt to influence asset prices and interest rates at all maturities in order to achieve 
their aims. Effective communication as much as credible policy actions are of fundamental 
importance for achieving these objectives. For central bank communication to be effective, it 
is important that it is disseminated to and understood by the targeted audience, and 
furthermore considered relevant by the receivers. Financial market participants, one major 
addressee of central banks, can be safely assumed to listen and indeed have been shown to be 
highly sensitive to central bank communication.
1 However, a central bank needs to reach out 
to a wider audience as well, in particular as it is the general public whose inflation 
expectations eventually feed into the actual evolution of inflation, e.g. through corresponding 
wage claims and savings, investment and consumption decisions, and thus determine whether 
a central bank is able to achieve its policy objectives.  
 
To our knowledge, there is to date no systematic analysis of how central bank actions and 
communication are disseminated to and perceived by the general public. The objective of the 
paper is to help fill this gap. In particular, the paper analyses how the media, specifically the 
printed press, report about the monetary policy decisions of the European Central Bank 
(ECB). We focus on two elements of the media reporting. One element is the extent of media 
coverage, as more extensive reporting in general allows a central bank to reach and to 
disseminate information to a wider audience. Another element relates to the favorableness 
with which the ECB’s monetary policy decision is discussed (a proxy for how well the 
reasons for a decision are understood and the decision therefore finds the consent of the 
media), since a reporting that explains the motivation of a given decision is an important 
factor influencing the central bank’s credibility and thus ultimately its policy effectiveness. 
 
Moreover, focusing on the case of the ECB adds an interesting dimension to the 
communication challenge. Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multi-
country, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual context. With the formation of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), countries with markedly different histories of 
inflation, monetary policy strategies as well as central banking institutions have delegated the 
conduct of monetary policy to a single entity, the ECB. EMU also means that monetary policy 
has a euro area-wide perspective and is no longer conducted with a focus on individual 
countries. Accordingly, communication by the ECB, and the implied euro area-wide focus of 
monetary policy, needs to be understood and received by a relatively heterogeneous audience. 
National media do therefore have an important role in making the central bank actions and its 
objectives understood by the national audiences. 
 
An analysis of the press reporting on the ECB is particularly interesting also because of a 
special feature of its communication policy, namely the conduct of a Press Conference on the 
days of the rate-setting meetings of its decision-making body, the Governing Council. These 
meetings typically take place on the first Thursday of each month. After the announcement of 
its monetary policy decisions at 13:45 (ECT), the Press Conference commences at around 
14.30, lasts about 45 minutes and is held by the ECB President and Vice-President. The Press 
Conference is an important element of the ECB’s communication strategy as it allows the 
ECB to elaborate in detail on the policy decision. It comprises two elements; a prepared 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Guthrie and Wright (2000), Kohn and Sack (2004), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) for three 
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decision, and a Questions & Answers part during which the President and the Vice-President 
are available to answer questions by the attending journalists. The combination of the release 
of monetary policy decisions and their explanation in the press conference the same day gives 
the print media a chance to discuss the central bank’s current assessment of the economic 
situation, its views on the economic outlook and the latest decision in one newspaper report. 
How the conduct of a Press Conference is reflected in press reporting is a natural question, 
that we investigate in detail in this paper. 
 
This paper uses a novel dataset that contains information both on the coverage and on the 
favorableness of the reporting of ECB monetary policy decisions, reaching back to 1999 and 
covering 57 international and national newspapers. The extent of coverage is measured as an 
index ranging from 0 (moderate coverage) to 4 (very extensive coverage). It is quantitative in 
nature, measuring the space and location of press reporting devoted to each policy decision. 
By contrast, the favorableness  index ranges from -2 (very negative coverage) to 2 (very 
favorable coverage). It is qualitative in nature, gauging the assessment of each policy decision 
by the media. It should be emphasized that the favorableness index strictly relates to the 
opinions expressed on any given decision, and not on the ECB or its monetary policy in 
general. As such, the index reflects whether or not a given decision is judged as justified 
given the economic environment. This, in turn, is likely to depend on the explanation for the 
given decision provided at the occasion of the press conference. Accordingly, the index is a 
proxy for how well the underlying motivation of a decision is understood by and finds the 
consent of the media, which is crucial for the credibility and ultimately the effectiveness of 
the central bank. 
 
As a first step, the paper shows that there is a clear mapping between favorableness and the 
extent of press coverage: the stronger are journalists’ opinions, the more is reported in the 
print media. Additionally, there is an asymmetry in the reporting as critical views are 
allocated more space in the newspapers than positive ones. Accordingly, it is important for the 
ECB to explain its decisions well, as particularly those decisions that are poorly understood 
are reported on more extensively.  
 
The main part of the paper then turns to analyzing the determinants of the extent and the 
favorableness of media reporting of ECB decisions. In particular, we find that the press 
critically discusses the ECB’s policy decisions in the context of prior market expectations and 
of the inflation environment. If a given policy decision comes as a surprise for markets, the 
tone of the reports is generally more negative. Similarly, the current decisions are discussed 
less favorably if the most recent euro area inflation figures exceed 2%, the ECB’s definition 
of price stability. These findings suggest that the media assumes a monitoring role, whereby it 
evaluates the performance of the independent central bank. By contrast, changes in monetary 
policy rates in the past have generally had a positive effect on the extent, and in some 
circumstances also on the favorableness of media coverage. 
 
From a policy perspective, an important question is how central bank communication affects 
the understanding and acceptance of a given policy decision, and whether this is reflected in 
improved favorableness and/or increased media coverage. We find both to be responsive to 
ECB communication, through the press conference as well as through statements in the inter-
meeting period. The empirical results show that in particular press conferences with a large 
informational content (as measured through the size of financial market reactions during the 
press conference, though keeping in mind that not all relevant information necessarily moves 
markets) imply a better understanding of a given decision by the public, which is reflected in 
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more favorable press reports. Moreover, we find that decisions that have been accompanied 
by a relatively large number of statements by the ECB president, and to a lesser extent by 
other committee members, in the preceding inter-meeting period receive a significantly larger 
and more positive coverage. 
 
Both of these findings suggest that media reports are responsive to efforts by the ECB to 
explain the motivation behind a given decision. This is in particular the case for relatively 
surprising decisions, which are normally reported upon in a rather critical fashion. A 
provision of substantial information during the Press Conference in the aftermath of such a 
decision implies a better acceptance by the public, which is mirrored in more positive press 
reporting. However, there also appear clear cases where the press is unresponsive to the 
provision of information in its assessment of ECB decisions. For instance, we find that the 
media reporting of ECB policy decisions is always more negative in tone when inflation is 
relatively high, even when communication is intense and the information content of press 
conferences is high. 
 
In relation to this, we also find that the release of special information and a number of special 
events during the press conferences help a better perception of policy decisions, and 
consequently enhance the favorableness of reporting. In the years from 1999-2002, the ECB 
used to announce the outcome of its review of the reference value for M3 growth on the 
occasion of the December press conference; more recently, the ECB has started to release 
inflation and output growth projections on a quarterly basis during the press conference. In 
both cases, favorableness of the newspaper reports is found to be significantly improved. In 
addition, the ECB’s tradition of holding Governing Council meetings with subsequent press 
conferences outside Frankfurt twice a year appears to increase awareness of the public in the 
visited country, as newspaper reports in these countries turn substantially more favorable and 
significantly expand the coverage of ECB press conference. 
 
Finally, looking into the national dimension of newspaper coverage, we find that there is 
basically no role for national biases in the tone of the discussion. Whereas national media 
coverage  intensifies  if national inflation deviates relatively strongly from the euro area 
figures, the favorableness of the national coverage is unaffected. One interpretation of this 
finding is that national media explain more extensively why a given monetary policy decision 
has been taken, without judging it from a purely national viewpoint. As such, the national 
media may play an important role in transmitting the ECB’s policy intentions to their national 
audiences, and may contribute to a homogeneous understanding and perception of the role of 
the ECB. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the 
relevant literature, and develops some hypotheses about the determinants of press coverage of 
central bank actions. Section 3 discusses the data set that is employed in the analysis, while 
Section 4 explains the empirical methodology. The link between favorableness and extent of 
newspaper reporting is explained in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results regarding the 
determinants of both favorableness and coverage, whereas Section 7 provides more details on 
how communication by the ECB to explain the motivation behind a given decision, either 
through the press conference, or in the inter-meeting period, affect understanding and 
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Given the importance of communication for monetary policy, central banks closely monitor 
the press coverage they receive; for the ECB, this is done on the basis of the indices that we 
will use in our empirical analysis. In the academic literature, however, to our knowledge this 
paper is the first to provide a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the determinants of 
press coverage a central bank receives. There is a notable exception, De Haan et al. (2004), 
who analyze reports on the ECB’s monetary policy decisions in 1999 and 2000, published in 
the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and in the Financial Times (FT). The paper finds 
differences in the reporting of the two newspapers, as, e.g., the FT reports considerably less 
and more critical about the role of monetary aggregates in the ECB’s monetary policy 
decisions than the FAZ. Beyond this partial analysis, to our knowledge no research has been 
conducted into this topic for any central bank.
2 This is surprising, as the role of 
communication in the conduct of monetary policy has been the focus of a substantial body of 
research recently. However, most of this research focuses on the effects of communication on 
financial markets, thus limiting the analysis to only one (although important) target group for 
central banks. 
 
Monetary policy has a relatively direct leverage over very short-term (i.e., overnight) interest 
rates. To steer the behavior of economic agents, however, it is necessary to affect longer-term 
interest rates, where the central bank influence is much more indirect. Blinder (1998) and 
Bernanke (2004), among others, emphasize the importance of communication as a means for 
central banks to influence these asset prices, provided that the central bank has acquired 
credibility. In that respect, communication can enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy 
implementation. To this end, communication must be able to influence the expectations of 
economic agents, such that the desired reaction of longer-term interest rates is achieved. In 
addition, communication is a crucial central bank instrument to limit the scope for unwanted 
policy surprises in the short-term. Beyond its importance in normal times, communication has 
been highlighted as a particularly effective tool under the zero lower bound, i.e. when nominal 
interest rates are close or equal to zero (Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack 2004, Woodford 2005). 
 
The empirical literature has come to a consensus that communication, including by the ECB, 
is a powerful tool to move financial markets. Guthrie and Wright (2000) find this for the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Kohn and Sack (2004) for the Federal Reserve, Reeves and 
Sawicki (2005) for the Bank of England, and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) in a 
comparative study for the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the ECB. Looking at the 
content of communication in more detail, there is evidence that it is in particular statements 
including an indication about the future path of policy that move financial markets (Brand, 
Buncic and Turunen 2006, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005a, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 
2005). 
 
Several studies have recently looked at communication by the ECB, covering a wide range of 
the ECB’s communication tools. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) study the effect of 
statements by individual Governing Council members, and find them to exert sizable effects 
on financial markets. This holds in particular when the communication is directly related to 
the future path of interest rates, whereas statements about the economic outlook are less 
influential. One important aspect is the extent to which communication is consistent across 
committee members. Jansen and de Haan (2006) find that statements among the individual 
                                                 
2 A broadly related discussion among media analysts focuses on the coverage economic news per se, for 
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members of the ECB’s Governing Council about interest rates exhibited some degree of 
dispersion initially, which decreased over time, whereas they identify an increasing dispersion 
in statements about inflation. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005b) find that dispersed 
communication lowers the predictability of monetary policy decisions for the Federal 
Reserve, the Bank of England as well as the ECB, although dispersed communication about 
the economic outlook may actually help financial markets better anticipate the path of future 
policy. Gerlach (2004) develops a quantitative indicator from the assessment of inflation, 
economic activity and M3 growth in the editorial of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletins, and finds 
that this indicator can explain interest-rate setting of the ECB. In a similar fashion, Rosa and 
Verga (2005) and Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) analyze the content of the ECB’s 
introductory statements to the press conference following Governing Council meetings. They 
construct indicators for the monetary policy stance based on the words used in the statements, 
and similarly show that the indicators can explain interest-rate setting, although they serve as 
substitutes, not as complements to macroeconomic variables in Taylor-type rules.  
 
While the literature agrees that communication is an important policy tool, the role of the 
media in this transmission process has, surprisingly, hardly been studied before. Similarly, to 
our knowledge there has been no research into the role of national media in informing the 
general public on monetary policy in the euro area. The creation of a monetary union of 
countries with markedly different economic and financial structures, with substantial diversity 
in the historical role of central banks and, accordingly, heterogeneous historical experiences 
of inflation have led to concerns that there might be asymmetries in the transmission of the 
ECB’s monetary policy across countries. In the run-up to EMU, several papers asked whether 
a change in policy rates would affect national economies in a heterogeneous fashion (e.g., 
Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi 1998; Cecchetti 2001; Mihov 2001). However, results are 
contradictory across studies (Mojon and Peersman 2003). Differences in the way and intensity 
with which national media report about the ECB might come into play here, too; on the one 
hand, they could lead to, or perpetuate, different perceptions of economic agents about the 
role of central banks; on the other hand, press coverage that respects national characteristics 
and backgrounds might actually be conducive to a more homogeneous public understanding 
of the ECB’s monetary policy.  
 
Finally, for a central bank to be accountable, a public discussion of its performance in 
parliamentary committees, through central bank watchers but also in the media, is an 
important ingredient. An independent central bank in a democratic society has the legal and 
political obligation to justify and explain its decisions to the public and its elected 
representatives. For instance, Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling (2000) show that 
transparency enhances central bank accountability. However, ever since its establishment, the 
ECB has been faced with considerable discussions on the extent to which it is accountable and 
transparent (see recently Goodhart, 2005). The ECB itself has clarified how it aims to be 
accountable (e.g. ECB 2002). However, very little empirical research has yet been conducted 
on the link between monetary policy and the media, and this is where the present paper 
attempts to contribute. 
 
A key issue in order to understand the role of the media in the transmission process of central 
bank communication is: what determines the favorableness and the extent of the media 
coverage? A good starting point to answer this question is the concept of a market for 
information. In principle, the market outcome will reflect both supply and demand side forces. 
On the supply side, journalists’ partisan preferences could play a role, a factor that media 
experts discussing the question of political bias in U.S. media tend to stress (see Groseclose 
and Milyo 2005). Economists are more likely to look for the influence of preferences on the 
11
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demand side. For instance, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) make a convincing argument 
that it is the interaction of consumer demand and profit maximizing news providers that 
explains whether, how, and to what extent a certain news item is reported in media.  
 
One implication of economic theory is that, among other factors, the favorableness of a media 
report is likely to influence the amount of coverage a particular news item gets. This may be 
of particular importance when it comes to news about monetary policy. Typical consumers of 
news in this field, such as financial market professionals or citizen voters trying to gauge the 
performance of their government, will often have certain expectations on the future policy 
path and the economy. Because information and its processing are costly, they are likely to 
pay special attention to media reports that may cause changes in the outlook.
3 As a 
consequence, news production will seek out and give more room to messages that are 
extraordinary and unexpected, which will often take the form of “good” or “bad” news. Thus, 
we should expect something like a U-shaped relation between the favorableness with which a 
particular news item is perceived and reported, and the coverage it will receive in the media. 
Moreover, if the market for information on monetary policy functions like other information 
markets, the coverage will be asymmetrical, that is, coverage of what is considered bad or 
negative news will tend to exceed that of other news (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Fogarty 2005).  
 
Central banks are an important principal news source in this respect. They not only provide a 
steady stream of routine information (e.g., on financials statistics such as the growth of 
monetary aggregates
4) that may qualify as “neutral” news, they also supply ample material of 
potential front-page caliber (for instance, through interest rate or other policy action), which, 
depending on circumstances, may fall in the good or bad news category. In addition, central 
banks communicate intensively through the media with the public and financial markets. 
Taking the example of the ECB, policy decisions taken during regular Governing Council 
meetings are announced, commented by the Council in the written introductory statement read 
by the ECB President on the outset of the regular press conference following the meeting, and 
discussed in an often extensive give-and-take between journalists, the President and the Vice-
President during the press conference. Moreover, the President as well as other Governing 
Council members (i.e., members of the centrally appointed ECB Executive Board, including 
the Vice President, as well the Governors of all euro area member country central banks) 
frequently deliver speeches addressing the public. Finally, the ECB also makes more technical 
announcements, including on its monetary strategy and its staff’s inflation forecast.  
 
This suggests that the circumstances of a given policy decision as well as the explanation 
given for it in the accompanying communication, will influence the amount and the type of 
news coverage it receives. For instance, the type of a policy decision will play an important 
role. This is certainly true for interest rate changes, which have the potential of being cast as 
particularly good or bad news (depending on perspective) and should, therefore, increase 
central bank news coverage. But a similar argument holds, more generally, for policy 
surprises, including the absence of an expected interest rate change.  
 
                                                 
3 The classical reference on the newsworthiness of information is Galtung and Ruge (1965). They identified a 
number of factors making it more probable that an event would be selected as news, including the element of 
unambiguity, surprise, and the intensity of newsworthiness beyond certain thresholds. See, for instance, 
Hamilton (2004) for a recent discussion. 
4 For instance, the ECB (other than the Federal Reserve) still reports regularly on M3 growth. Comparing the 
development of M3 with a pre-set reference value thought to be compatible with the ECB’s inflation objective 
(of below but close to 2 percent) is part of its monetary policy strategy. 
12
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Furthermore, central bank communication, both on and between Governing Council meeting 
days, will be crucial for the perception of a decision and the ensuing press coverage it 
receives. Clearly, if the ECB Governing Council makes more intensive use of its post-meeting 
press conference to channel information to journalists, financial markets and the public, there 
is more room for reporting on the ECB than otherwise. The same holds true for inter-meeting 
communication efforts by Governing Council members and other communication, including, 
for example, the release of the reference value for M3 growth or of the ECB staff’s 
projections. Finally, a special feature of the ECB’s communication relevant in this regard is 
that the Governing Council holds its meetings outside Frankfurt in other euro area countries 
twice a year. We would expect the national media in the respective country to report more 
extensively about those press conferences. The meeting may be a noteworthy fact in itself, in 
particular in smaller countries, and the governor of the corresponding national central bank 
attends the post-meeting press conference at the occasion. 
 
But central bank news coverage will also depend on the economic environment. We can 
expect macroeconomic conditions to influence the favorableness and amount of central bank 
news coverage. In part, this may also reflect a “watchdog” function of the media. For 
instance, if the media takes on a role as a critical observer that scrutinizes the actions of the 
ECB as an independent central bank, we would expect media coverage to be more negative 
and extensive if rates of inflation exceeded the ECB’s objective. Similarly, media attention 
may vary with real activity in the euro area. Another (mostly exogenous) element in the 
economic environment that may be important is monetary policy elsewhere, in particular in 
the U.S. The ECB operates in an international environment. Contrasting the ECB’s policy 
with those of other central banks may help financial markets and the public gauging the 
actions of the ECB. 
 
Finally, a number of country-specific conditions could possibly influence the tone and the 
extent of the coverage a central bank like the ECB will receive in the media. They include 
deviations of a country’s inflation or growth performance from the euro area average and a 
country’s historical inflation experience, which might be indicative of a larger established 
preference for central bank watching. For instance, we can imagine that the media in a 
country with relatively large deviations of inflation from the euro area average and/or a 
history of high inflation rates would be more concerned with the doings of the ECB than 
elsewhere. Country size may matter as well in the sense that larger countries may have more 
specialized media outlets that, quite naturally, would devote more time to ECB coverage. 
What is more, national media attention might be affected if one of the members of the ECB’s 
Executive Board is of the same nationality. In short, the objective of the present paper is to 
test these various hypotheses for the case of ECB monetary policy decisions. 
 
Summing up the main hypotheses, we expect to find a non-linear link between ECB press 
coverage and the favorability of reporting on the ECB, with a possible bias in the sense that 
news perceived as negative will receive larger media coverage. One implication is that, 
because favorableness is a determinant of news coverage, variables driving the perception of 
ECB-related events should, in principle, also influence the amount of media coverage these 
events receive. Other variables, unrelated to favorableness, may influence media coverage 
directly. In either case, determinants of favorableness and coverage are likely to include the 
ECB’s own policy decisions, the ECB’s communication, the economic environment, and 
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3.   Data on Press Coverage  
 
The analysis in this paper is based on a novel dataset that measures the favorableness and the 
quantity of press coverage of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions received after the press 
conference. This dataset comprises indices for each euro area country and some international 
press. It has been created by specialized media experts in the ECB’s Press and Information 
Division for the purpose of internal reporting, with a view to analyzing press reactions in a 
systematic fashion, and to provide comparisons over time and across countries.
5  
 
The ECB’s media experts read the reports in a large sample of European newspapers 
immediately following the Governing Council meetings. As the ECB’s monetary policy 
decisions are announced and shortly afterwards explained in a press conference on Thursdays, 
the indices are based on the Friday and weekend editions of 57 newspapers, 18 of which can 
be categorized as financial press. Table 1 gives an overview of the newspapers that are 
covered.  
 
Table 1  
 
Coverage of each newspaper is measured in a qualitative index and a quantitative index. The 
qualitative index measures the favorableness with which the ECB’s monetary policy decision 
is discussed on a scale ranging from -2 to 2, with the interpretation 
 
-2 – very  negative; 
-1 – negative; 
0 – neutral; 
1 – favorable; 
2 – very  favorable.
 
The favorableness index strictly relates to the opinions expressed on any given decision, and 
not on the ECB or its monetary policy in general. As such, the index reflects whether or not a 
given decision is judged as justified given the economic environment. This, in turn, is likely 
to depend on the explanation for the given decision provided at the occasion of the press 
conference. Accordingly, the index is a proxy for how well a decision is understood by the 
media – which is crucial for the credibility and ultimately the effectiveness of the central bank 
– rather than the popularity of the decisions or the institution.  
 
Negative entries of the index imply that the media express their discontent with a given 
decision, whereas positive numbers reflect media’s approval. To give an example, a decision 
not to lower interest rates could be criticized by the media if the journalists think that a rate 
cut was possible without posing risks to price stability at the current juncture. Alternatively, a 
decision not to hike interest rates could be criticized, e.g., if the media perceive inflation as 
too high, and would have preferred a more aggressive tightening. In both cases, the 
favorableness index would report a negative number.  
 
For the quantitative index, each newspaper is allocated a ranking between 0 and 4, implying 
different coverage intensities as follows:  
 
                                                 
5 The underlying concept of media analysis and monitoring has been developed by Jukka Ahonen, a press officer 
in the ECB’s Press and Information Division. Each Governing Council meeting is covered by several press 
officers, as a number of languages need to be covered. This number ranges from 3 to 8; in total, 20 press officers 
have been involved in the construction of the indices since 1999. 
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0 – poor; minor news item based possibly on a news agency report, a couple of sentences 
added to another story, or no coverage at all; 
1 – moderate; one column headline or a small news item, report written by the newspaper’s 
staff, the issue mentioned;  
2 – average; no front page news, medium importance elsewhere in the paper, two to three 
column headline;  
3 – extensive; a minor hint on the first page, one of the leading news items elsewhere;  
4 – very extensive; major news, headlines of four to six columns on the front page. 
 
These rankings are adjusted to the style of the newspaper. Finally, a national index is 
constructed by taking a simple arithmetic average of the different newspapers in a given 
country or for the international press, and by rounding it to the closest half-point. 
Accordingly, the indices range over nine possible outcomes, namely {-2; -1.5; -1; -0.5; 0; 0.5; 
1; 1.5; 2} for the favorableness index, and {0; 0.5; 1; 1.5; 2; 2.5; 3; 3.5; 4} for the quantitative 
measure of press coverage. The indices are available to us starting with the Governing 
Council meeting on October 7, 1999, and ending with the meeting on January 13, 2005.  
 
Given the novelty of this data set, a number of remarks are in order. In particular, it should be 
kept in mind that our analysis focuses exclusively on a particular segment of the printed press, 
as e.g. it does not include regional newspapers, which very often have a large circulation. 
Also, it does not include other media, such as television or radio reporting. Accordingly, there 
is a substantial part of the general public that is out of reach of the media analyzed here. 
 
Despite the substantial experience of the media experts with such assessments, the 
favorableness index is clearly subject to a good deal of judgment by the media experts, and 
might therefore entail elements of subjectivity. We will address this possibility in our 
econometric analysis by controlling for expert-fixed effects. As the quantitative ranking gives 
much more precise and objective instructions to the media experts, subjectivity should be less 
of a concern for this index. However, because it cannot be entirely excluded, we will resort to 
expert-fixed effects when analyzing press coverage as well.  
 
A potential caveat is that the extent of press coverage that the ECB’s monetary policy 
decisions receives is likely to depend on the occurrence of other news on the same day, which 
could possibly crowd out the reporting on the ECB (a factor that should apply less to the 
favorableness of the reporting, though). For sufficiently large samples, this issue should be 
less of a concern; if anything, it would bias the effect of our explanatory variables 
downwards. Furthermore, the panel structure employed in the empirical analysis is well 
equipped to handle the effects of fixed and random national events which will mainly be 
limited to the respective national press. 
 
The averaging across newspapers within countries implies certain advantages, but at the same 
time brings about some disadvantages. For instance, the index does not take into account 
differences in circulation or the importance of each newspaper as an opinion leader, as it does 
not attach larger weights to more widely read newspapers. It can therefore not assess in detail 
how many readers are likely to be reached by the reports. The averaging across specialized 
and general newspapers implies similar complications – as the two types of newspapers target 
different audiences, dissemination of the news among the general or the specialized public 
cannot be precisely assessed. The main advantage of averaging lies in its robustness to 
outliers, however. As the indices for each country are generally based on several newspapers, 
the average indices are likely to represent a good overall picture of media attention in a given 
15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 679
September 2006 
country. All in all, the indices are therefore particularly useful in comparative analyses, either 




Table 2 provides a number of summary statistics for the indices. Our sample consists of 54 
meetings, although the coverage is slightly smaller for some individual countries and for the 
quantitative index. The coverage of individual countries varies slightly over time, due to 
possible delays in delivery of the newspapers. Overall, the favorableness index is rather 
balanced, with a mean across countries and over time of 0.041. Interestingly, the most 
extreme cases of ±2 are never reached in the country averages.  
 
There is substantial variation in the indices, both across countries and over time. While 
Greece and Ireland are the countries with the overall least favorable reporting, Luxembourg 
and Spain are those with the most favorable, with a difference in the index of around 0.2. This 
difference is even larger if it comes to quantities, with coverage in Austria and Luxembourg 
being around one point lower than in Germany and Italy. Most of the variation is found over 
time, though. With respect to favorableness, the range within a given country spans at least 2 
full points; for coverage, in all but one country the maximal entry is equal to four, i.e. the 
highest possible. The full range of entries, from zero to four, is covered for two countries; in 




Table 3 shows cross-country correlations of both indices, with the correlations for the 
favorableness index reported below, and those for the coverage index above the diagonal. All 
but two entries are positive, and generally, correlations are relatively large, pointing to the fact 
that there is a substantial amount of time variation that is common across countries. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 
 
Figures 1 and 2 plot the average value of the indices for each Governing Council meeting and 
the standard deviation across countries as a measure of the country differentiation. An 
interesting observation from Figure 1 is that favorableness seems to have been relatively more 
volatile in the beginning of the sample, whereas it appears to have stabilized around a 
relatively neutral level towards the end, with little effect on the cross-country standard 
deviation. Regarding the quantity of press coverage, the level of reporting on the ECB seems 
to have been somewhat lower toward the end of the sample—perhaps reflecting the absence 
of interest rate changes during that period. Figure 2 seems to suggest that this had little or no 
influence on cross-country differences in ECB coverage, however. Overall, the figures 
suggest that there is substantial variation over time, but no systematic longer-term trend. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that cross-country differences as measured by the standard 
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4.   Empirical Model  
 
As the next step, we turn to outlining the definition of the various potential determinants for 
the press coverage of ECB decisions (section 4.1), before explaining the empirical 
methodology employed for the analysis (section 4.2). 
 
4.1  Determinants of media coverage 
 
In section 2, we derived a number of hypotheses as to the likely determinants of favorableness 
and the extent of press coverage. To test these hypotheses, we define a comprehensive set of 
explanatory variables, which are described below.
6 
 
ECB’s policy decisions and communication  
Policy decisions 
ECB Monetary Policy 
Surprise 
Dummy variable; set to one if the monetary policy decision 
has surprised markets (defined by the median response in the 
regular Reuters poll)
7  
ECB Interest Rate Change   Dummy variable; one for Governing Council meetings at 
which policy rates are changed  
Meeting-Day Communication  
Market Reaction During the 
Press Conference 
Proxy for the informational content of the Press Conference, 
based on the absolute return in the German long-term bund 
futures contracts during the course of the entire press 
conference
8 
Governing Council Meetings 
Outside Frankfurt 
Dummy variable; one for the country in which the meeting 
takes place, zero for all other countries, zero for all countries 
for meetings in Frankfurt 
Inter-Meeting Communication  
Communication Frequency, 
President 
Number of statements about monetary policy inclination by 
the ECB president in the inter-meeting period, based on 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) 
                                                 
6 Sources for the data, if not indicated otherwise in the text: central bank websites; macro variables are real-time 
data as available at the day of the respective press conference, taken from Bloomberg. Details are available on 
request. 
7 The Reuters poll surveys between about 30 and 60 financial market forecasters prior to each meeting during 
our sample period. 
8 We opted for long-term contracts due to data availability and because longer maturities react more to monetary 
policy statements (such as the ECB’s press conference) than to the release of monetary policy decisions (see 
Brand, Buncic and Turunen 2006 for the euro area and Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 2005 for the US). Returns 
are based on long-term German government bond futures contracts with a remaining term to maturity of between 
8.5 and 10.5 years, traded on the European Exchange (EUREX; Source: TickData Inc). These contracts reflect 
the benchmark status in the long-term segment of the euro area bond market. Absolute returns are calculated as  
rt =abs[100*ln(pt/pt-1)], where pt-1 and pt relate to the price of the last trades prior and during the ECB’s press 
conference, respectively. For further details on the underlying data, such as the methodology applied for 
switching to the next maturity contracts, see Andersson et al. (2006).  
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Number of statements about monetary policy inclination by 
Governing Council members other than the president in the 
inter-meeting period, based on Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2006) 
Other Communication  
Clarification of the Strategy   Step dummy, takes the value of one after the ECB has 
clarified its monetary policy strategy in May 2003 
Release of Reference Value of 
M3 Growth 
Dummy variable, set to one for press conferences where the 
reference values of M3 growth have been released 
Release of Staff Projections  Dummy variable, set to one for press conferences where the 
ECB staff projections for future inflation and output growth 
have been released  
 
Economic Environment  
Euro Area Macro Conditions 
Euro Area Inflation  Dummy variable; one if the latest figure for euro area HICP 
inflation released by the time of the press conference exceeds 
2%, the ECB’s definition of price stability 
Euro Area Industrial  
Production 
Dummy variable; one if the latest figure for euro area 
industrial production released by the time of the press 
conference exceeds the sample average 
Federal Reserve  
Interest Rate Change by the 
Federal Reserve’s FOMC 
Dummy variable; one if US policy rates have been changed 




Absolute National Inflation 
Differential 
Absolute difference between national and euro area HICP 
inflation  
Nationality of Executive 
Board Members 
Dummy variable; one for countries with an Executive Board 
member of the same nationality 
Country Size  Dummy variable; one for the three largest economies in the 
euro area (France, Germany and Italy) and for the 
international press 
Historical Inflation  Average national consumer price inflation, 1950-1998 
 
This set comprises the benchmark explanatory variables for our model, although other 
controls are added in some instances to the empirical specification to ensure and test for 
robustness, as explained in the subsequent sub-section. 
 
 
4.2  Empirical methodology 
 
In the empirical analysis, we proceed in three steps. First, we establish the relationship 
between favorableness and the amount of press coverage. In line with the hypotheses 
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expressed above, the evidence suggests that more extreme, positive or negative, values of 
favorableness lead to larger press coverage. At the same time, however, negative news is 
reported upon more extensively than positive or neutral news. As this supports the notion of 
favorableness as a likely determinant of press coverage, the second step in the empirical 
analysis will be to identify the drivers of favorableness. Building on these results, we will, in 
the third step, attempt to identify which factors can help explaining the quantity of press 
coverage. 
 
For the formulation of the empirical model, we need to take into account that the dependent 
variable is an ordinal variable, in the sense that larger values imply more favorable or more 
extensive press coverage, although it is not possible to interpret a doubling in the value of the 
indices as a doubling in the favorableness or amount of press reporting. We will therefore 
resort to estimating panel ordered probit models. These models estimate an underlying score 
as a linear function of the independent variables X and a set of cut-points µi. The probability 
of observing a given outcome for the indices (outcome) does then depend on the probability 
that the linear function β’X+u, when evaluated with the realizations of the independent 
variables, lies within the range of the cut-points for the respective outcome:  
 
) ' Pr( ) Pr( 1 i i u X i outcome µ β µ ≤ + < = = −  
 
The error term u is assumed to be normally distributed; the lowest and highest cut-points are 
assumed to be minus and plus infinity.  
 
Beyond the independent variables outlined above, we introduce a large number of controls, 
covering a range of factors that could affect the way the press reports about the ECB’s policy 
decisions.
9 These include an impulse dummy for conferences after the summer break. 
Traditionally, in August, the ECB holds its Governing Council meeting in the form of a 
teleconference, and does not hold a press conference afterwards. Accordingly, we want to 
allow for the possibility that the summer break increases media attention in the subsequent 
meeting. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, the coverage of newspapers varies across countries, 
with differences in the overall number, as well as the fraction of specialized journals. 
Furthermore, newspaper coverage varies slightly over time, due to unavailability of some 
newspapers at the time of the construction of the index. We control for this composition effect 
in three ways. First, we construct a dummy variable for countries with one or no specialized 
newspaper in the sample. Second, we enter the number of newspapers sampled within each 
country for each press conference, as a variable that varies across countries and over time. 
Third, on top of this, we construct and include an equivalent variable for the coverage of 
specialized newspapers for each country and press conference.  
 
A last group of controls captures possible idiosyncrasies in the evaluation and categorization 
process. We introduce fixed effect variables for each of the experts producing the press 
indices, which take the value of one for any index measure produced by this individual. In 
addition to expert-fixed effects, we initially enter country-fixed effects in some of the 
empirical models to extract country-specific differences in the favorableness or amount of 
press coverage. In a later stage, these country-fixed effects are dropped in favor of trying to 
explain country-differences by country-specific variables.
10  
 
                                                 
9 Results for most of those control variables are not reported here for brevity, but are available upon request. 
10 All results are qualitatively identical, and even quantitatively extremely similar with using country-random 
effects or simple OLS. 
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5.   The Relationship between Favorableness and Quantity of Press Coverage 
 
In Section 2, we had hypothesized that more extreme opinions on the side of the press are 
likely to be reflected in more extensive reporting, such that favorableness should be a 
determinant of press coverage. Table 4 reports results from a number of models that aim to 
explain the amount of press coverage by different variants of favorableness. Model (1) shows 
that there is no linear relationship between favorableness and press coverage. However, 
Model (2) provides evidence of a non-linear relationship: the absolute value of the 
favorableness index is significantly related to the amount of reporting, with more extreme 
opinions leading to more extensive coverage. Finally, Model (3) amends the previous one by 
adding a dummy variable that is equal to one if the favorableness index is negative.  
 
These results suggest, on the one hand, that more extreme opinions raise the level of 
reporting, and, on the other, that negative opinions lead to more extensive coverage than 
positive or neutral ones. Accordingly, it is important for the ECB to explain its decisions well, 




On the basis of this evidence, we will proceed in two steps in the analysis below. First, we 
will estimate a model for the favorableness index, searching for factors that affect the 
opinions expressed in the press. In a second step, we will then analyze whether these factors 
translate directly into the amount of press coverage, or whether some of the determinants of 
press coverage do not impact on the intensity of reporting. Finally, we will allow for the 
possibility that other factors, which do not have a bearing on the favorableness of the 
reporting, determine the intensity of press coverage.  
 
 
6.   Determinants of Favorableness and Press Coverage 
 
In our empirical approach, we first estimate a benchmark Model (1) containing only a small 
set of the potentially most relevant determinants. Further explanatory variables are then added 
in the second step (2) to assess the robustness of results in Model (1). Both models include 
country-fixed effects to ensure that all other parameter estimates are not affected by cross-
country differences in the average favorableness or extent of press coverage. Continuing from 
there, we modify the model to (3) by dropping the country-fixed effects and adding country-
specific variables, in order to identify possible determinants for different average 
favorableness or coverage across countries.  
 
All results are reported in Tables 5 (favorableness) and 6 (extent of press coverage), showing 
the parameter estimates for the underlying linear function of the independent variables, β, as 
described above. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 
 
 
6.1  ECB policy decisions and communication  
 
Turning to the ECB’s policy decisions, Table 5 shows that monetary policy surprises lead to 
less favorable reporting in the press. Two factors could potentially explain this result –
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surprises could generally be considered undesirable by the press, or financial market analysts, 
who often are interviewed by journalists to comment on the decisions, feel a need to explain 
their forecasting mistake and therefore comment in a rather critical fashion. At the same time, 
and somewhat at odds with our priors, however, there is less press coverage in this case 
(Table 6). We will return to this issue in more detail in the subsequent section. By contrast, 
decisions to change interest rates are perceived well by the press – favorableness notches up, 
although only at low levels of statistical significance. And, as expected, there is a large and 
highly significant increase in the amount of reporting.  
 
Moreover, we find a large positive effect of Governing Council meetings held outside 
Frankfurt on favorableness and coverage in the respective national media.
11 The results 
suggest that the tradition of the Governing Council to hold meetings outside Frankfurt 
substantially increases media attention in the respective country. 
 
The extent to which a given decision is understood by the media is likely to depend on the 
explanation given by the ECB, i.e. its communication. To analyze how reporting responds to 
ECB communication, we first look at the role of communication on the meeting day through 
the Press Conference. We take the absolute return of long-term bonds during the about 45-
minute long Press Conference as a proxy for the information content that is conveyed. The 
argument is that a larger reaction during the Press Conference implies that the public is able to 
extract more relevant information from it. The results of Tables 5 and 6 indicate that more 
information is beneficial for the favorableness with which the press reports, as well as for the 
amount of press coverage that the ECB can achieve. This finding is in line with the hypothesis 
that the information conveyed during the Press Conference allows the reporting press to better 
understand the rationale of the policy decision, thus inducing a more positive media 
assessment. 
 
A closely linked factor relates to the communication of Governing Council members in the 
time prior to the meeting. We find that both favorableness and coverage respond to the 
number of statements that contain forward-looking information regarding monetary policy 
inclinations, suggesting that more communication ex ante will lead to a better understanding 
of the decision, and thus to a more favorable and more extensive reporting ex post. As this 
type of communication is, as a rule, consistent with subsequent monetary policy decisions 
(Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2006), it is likely to contribute to a better understanding of the 
decision by the public. Furthermore, a higher number of statements prior to Governing 
Council meetings might allow for a more interesting reporting on the ECB’s policy decisions 
and the ensuing press conferences, as articles can relate to the earlier statements. 
Alternatively, a higher frequency of direct communication might increase the ECB’s visibility 
before the meeting, leading to a higher incentive to cover the monetary policy decision. 
Interestingly, the media also appears to clearly differentiate between communication by the 
ECB president and other Governing Council members – the effect of the latter is 
substantially, and statistically significantly smaller than of the former.
12  
 
                                                 
11 Beyond its effect on the national media, meetings outside Frankfurt do not generally affect coverage in the 
other countries. 
12 An alternative explanation that could be relevant for the amount of coverage, but less so for favorableness, is 
that intensified inter-meeting communication might itself be a reflection of a heightened need to communicate 
more on behalf of the Governing Council, for instance in times of increased uncertainty, which, in turn, could 
also explain the elevated interest of the press. Also note that the analysis is purely backward-looking. 
Accordingly, no implications can be drawn as to how different approaches to communication in the future could 
affect media coverage. 
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Finally, Models (2) and (3) contain a number of variables that reflect other communication 
types by the ECB. First, there is no discernible response of favorableness to the clarification 
of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in May 2003.
13 On the other hand, whenever the ECB 
releases additional relevant information during its press conferences, such as the reference 
value for M3 growth (released in the December press conferences from 1999 until 2002) or 
the staff projections for inflation and output growth (released quarterly since June 2004), 
opinions expressed in the press are clearly more approving. Interestingly, all these factors tend 
to decrease the amount of press coverage, albeit at different levels of statistical significance. 
Though at first puzzling, it could very well be that the provision of clear information makes 
journalists write less, as the news content is easier to convey to the readers, or that the focus 
on the special content induces journalists to report less on other, more complex information 
conveyed during the press conference. 
 
To summarize, a number of factors that relate to the ECB’s behavior, be it its decisions or its 
communication, substantially alter the opinions expressed in the press and the extent to which 
this is done. First, it is important to note that press coverage increases with the news content 
provided by the ECB. Second, communication, either through the press conference, or in the 
inter-meeting period, affects understanding and acceptance of a given policy decision, which 
in turn is reflected in improved favorableness. Third, the release of additional information that 
allows the public to better understand the ECB’s monetary policy decisions, such as inflation 
projections or (until 2002) the reference value of M3 growth, are accordingly accompanied by 
positive press reports. Fourth, the occasional meetings outside Frankfurt have a significant 
and large effect on the national media in the visited country, by increasing awareness and 
even improving public opinion.  
 
 
6.2  The economic environment  
 
Turning to the effects of the economic environment within which a press conference takes 
place, there is clear evidence that press reporting is responsive to the most recent inflation 
figures. If euro area HICP inflation exceeds 2%, i.e. the ECB’s definition of price stability, 
press coverage of individual decisions becomes more critical and intensifies.
14 Although 
reporting is also responsive to the business cycle in general, there are important differences to 
the way the press responds to inflation developments: if euro area industrial production 
exceeds its sample average, i.e. if the euro area economy does better than on average, there is 
more attention to the ECB’s press conference, yet the opinion on the ECB’s policy decisions 
is not affected.  
 
At the same time, the ECB’s decisions seem to be discussed in an international context, as 
there is a marked increase in press coverage if the US Federal Reserve has changed its policy 
rates in the two weeks preceding the ECB decision. Apparently, interest rate changes by the 
Federal Reserve attract journalists’ attention to the actions of the ECB, possibly also because 
this allows the press to relate, and possibly contrast, a given decision with those of other 
central banks.
15 However, it is important to note that the opinions expressed are not affected 
                                                 
13 For more information, see http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030508_2.en.html.  
14 The same result is obtained for above-average inflation: reporting turns more negative and coverage increases 
if HICP inflation exceeds its sample mean.  
15 This is illustrated by newspaper headlines on November 3, 2005, i.e. one day prior to a Governing Council 
meeting: “Nach US-Zinserhöhung wartet Europa auf EZB-Entscheidung” (“Following the raise in US interest 
rates, Europe is now waiting for a decision by the ECB” – published in the Austrian newspaper Der Standard), 
or “Fed erhöht wieder Zinsen: Folgt EZB?” (“Fed raises interest rates again – will the ECB follow suit?” – 
published in the Austrian newspaper Salzburger Nachrichten). 
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in any sense, indicating that there is an unbiased discussion regardless of the actions of the 
Federal Reserve.  
 
To summarize, these results suggest that the media critically discusses the ECB’s policy 
decisions, leading to more critical remarks if the most recent inflation figures exceed the 
ECB’s definition of price stability, and that the reporting is embedded in the euro area 
macroeconomic as well as in an international context.  
 
 
6.3  Adding country-specific characteristics 
 
In addition to the economic environment of the euro area as a whole, press reporting in 
individual countries may be influenced by the country-specific conditions of these countries. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we drop the country-fixed effects in Model (3) of Tables 5 and 
6 in order to include and test for the importance of country-specific variables. As mentioned 
in Section 3, although differences over time dominate those across countries, it is nonetheless 
interesting to study which factors contribute to the observed country differences.  
 
A first important result is that the various explanatory factors in Model (3) are considerably 
more important for the quantity with which the national media report than for favorableness. 
For instance, in countries where national inflation rates deviate relatively more from the euro 
area average (both up and down), the press reports more, but not more critically.
16 This is in 
line with the finding reported in Section 3, that favorableness varies considerably less across 
countries than coverage. One reason for more extensive reporting could be that a larger gap 
between the national and the euro area performance will require more efforts by journalists to 
explain to their national audience why a particular ECB decision has been taken, as it requires 
disentangling the euro area from the national context. It should come as good news for euro 
area policy makers that this is done without a change in the tone of the discussion, suggesting 
that the press makes unbiased efforts to explain the euro area perspective of the ECB’s 
monetary policy to their national audience. One interpretation is that the national media play 
an important role in transmitting the ECB’s policy intentions to their national audiences, and 
contribute to a homogeneous understanding and perception of the role of the ECB. 
 
As to other country-specific conditions, we find that press coverage is substantially higher in 
large countries (i.e., in Germany, France and Italy as well as in the international press). This 
might reflect the fact that in large countries there is generally a wider range of newspapers to 
sample from. As a consequence, the press coverage index might cover more papers that cater 
to a relatively specialized audience with a higher interest in monetary matters.
17 Alternatively, 
it may reflect that larger countries have in some case been more autonomous in their conduct 
of monetary policy prior to monetary union, thus leading to a more extensive coverage of 
monetary policy-related issues in their media. A marginally significant increase in media 
attention can also be observed in the national press when one of the six members of the 
ECB’s Executive Board is of the same nationality. Importantly, however, none of these issues 
affects the opinions expressed in the respective media. The only exception relates to the role 
of history. We find that countries that historically have had higher inflation report relatively 
                                                 
16 The favorableness of reports does not depend on the actual (as opposed to the absolute) deviations of national 
from euro area inflation rates either. Hence it is not the case that in countries with relatively high inflation rates 
the ECB’s monetary policy decisions would be discussed more or less critically than in countries with relatively 
low inflation rates. 
17 Note that these results are based on a model that, in addition, controls for the number of journals as well as the 
presence and the number of specialized papers covered in the index per meeting and country. 
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more, as well as more critically, as higher average national inflation over a long time span 
from 1950-1998 lowers favorableness and increases coverage. However, the effect on 
favorableness is only marginally significant. 
 
To summarize, we find that national factors play a role, but predominantly in relation to the 
quantity with which the press reports. The evidence is consistent with the notion that the 
national media indeed has an important role in explaining the ECB’s decisions to their 
national audiences, in particular in times when national developments deviate more from the 
euro area average, and that this discussion is led in an unbiased fashion. 
 
 
6.4  Robustness and marginal effects 
 
We next turn to conducting various extensions and robustness tests of our findings. A first 
critical issue concerns the relationship between favorableness and the extent of media 
coverage outlined in Sections 2 and 5. In principle, if favorableness indeed is a determinant of 
news coverage, we can either include favorableness as an explanatory variable in the model 
for the quantity of press reporting. Alternatively, in what could be dubbed a reduced-form 
approach, we can include the set of variables determining favorableness in the model 
explaining ECB press coverage, adding the dummy variable indicating whether a given 
favorableness index has taken on a negative value as well as the residual from Model (3) for 
favorableness in the model for press coverage. This residual is the component of 
favorableness that cannot be accounted for by and thus is orthogonal to the common 
determinants of press favorableness and press coverage.
18 The reduced-form approach has the 
added advantage that it allows for variations in the set of explanatory variables across models 
(see above). 
 
The first two rows of Table 6 show that favorableness, to the extent that it is not picked up by 
other variables in the model, indeed influences the extent of press coverage: extreme views, as 
measured as the absolute of the favorableness residual, will find more coverage in the media 
than less polarized views. There is, moreover, an important asymmetry in this relationship as 
negative views trigger significantly more media coverage than positive views. This implies 
that the costs of unfavorable reporting for the ECB are disproportionately larger in terms of 
coverage than the benefits from a favorable press.  
 
Turning to modeling issues, our results prove remarkably robust along a number of 
dimensions. One interesting fact to note is that dropping the country-fixed effects in model 
(3), and replacing them with a few country-specific variables, hardly worsens the statistical fit 
of the model. The various pseudo-R
2 measures reported are either identical, or only 
marginally smaller than in the fixed-effect specification, and the BIC information criterion 
even weakly prefers model (3) over model (2).
19  
 
Allowing for seasonality in the extent of press coverage modifies our results as follows: The 
reductions in coverage for surprising decisions and for press conferences where the reference 
value of M3 growth is released are no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, we can no 
longer detect effects of rate changes by the Federal Reserve on the extent of reporting. All 
other results remain unchanged. 
                                                 
18 The residual has been estimated in the OLS regression of model (3) as reported in Table A3. All results are 
robust to dropping these two variables.  
19 See, for instance, Veall and Zimmermann (1996) for a discussion of the relative merits of the various pseudo-
R
2 measures for models with qualitative dependent variables. 
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When using a random effects estimator, results are not only qualitatively, but also 
quantitatively remarkably similar.
20 The only important modification of the results is that the 
size of inflation differentials and the historical inflation experience are no longer a relevant 
determinant for national press coverage. Moreover, ignoring the fact that the press coverage 
index is an ordinal variable, and just estimating simple OLS, yields basically the same 
conclusions with regard to statistical significance and sign of the regressors.
21 This is 
reassuring, because, other than the ordered probit framework, the OLS model allows directly 
and unconditionally interpreting the average direction as well as the magnitude of the impact 
of the independent variables on ECB press coverage. 
 
In addition, as we had to assign values to the international press for the country-specific 
variables in model (3) (e.g., for our measure of the historical inflation experience, we assigned 
it a neutral value at the euro area average), which might be somewhat arbitrary, we repeated 
the estimation of our models excluding the international press. Results are again in line with 
our baseline results,
22 suggesting that our findings are not driven by differences in the 
reporting of the national and the international press. 
 
Finally, for expositional ease, our result tables show the parameter estimates for the 
underlying linear function of the independent variables, β, as described in equation (1). From 
these tables, it is, strictly speaking, not possible to make any inference regarding the actual 
values of the favorableness and press coverage indices, as these are only defined in relation 
with the various cut-points µi. The more interesting results are therefore the marginal effects 
of a change in an independent variable on the probability for a given outcome of the indices.
23 
We have calculated these marginal effects separately for each possible outcome and for each 
variable (evaluated at the mean of the independent variable).  
 
For instance, the marginal effect of a change in the variable “ECB monetary policy surprise” 
can be calculated for the value “1.0” of the favorableness index. It would then denote how the 
probability that the favorableness index takes the value of 1.0 changes if the ECB decision has 
been surprising, relative to the probability in the case of an anticipated decision. If we assume 
that a surprising decision reduces this probability, it must be the case that another value of the 
favorableness index results as more likely. In other words, if an increase in an independent 
variable lowers the probability of a particular outcome, it must increase the probability of 
some other outcome. Figures 3 and 4 show the entire set of marginal effects – in a separate 
plot for each of the independent variables, and for the different possible outcomes within each 
of the subplots (the possible outcomes of the indices are indicated on the x-axis, the marginal 
effects on the y-axis). Results are shown for model (3), along with 95% confidence bounds.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 
 
A number of interesting results emerge from these figures. That we see positive and negative 
marginal effects within each subplot merely reflects the fact that an increasing probability for 
some outcome must be matched by a decreasing probability of another outcome. Of greater 
interest is the interpretation of where a given variable increases the probability.  
 
                                                 
20 Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix show the results for the set of regressions introduced in Tables 5 and 6, 
estimated with random country effects. 
21 See Tables A3 and A4. 
22 See Tables A5 and A6. 
23 See Greene (1997), pp. 926-929, for an excellent exposition of these issues. 
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The most extreme case is the one of the meetings outside Frankfurt. This variable is defined 
as a dummy variable, such that the marginal effect denotes the first derivative of the 
probability of a given outcome for a discrete change of the explanatory variable from 0 to 1. 
Figure 4 shows that the probability of the most extreme value of the coverage index increases 
by nearly 100% for the outside meetings, suggesting that the value of four is basically reached 
in all cases of outside meetings, and hardly ever otherwise. Recollecting the definition of the 
index, a value of four implies very extensive reporting, such as headlines of four to six 
columns on the front page of newspapers. Hence, the tradition of the Governing Council to 
hold meetings outside Frankfurt substantially increases media attention in the respective 
country.  
 
Most other variables with a significant impact tend to increase mainly the probability of more 
intermediate ranges of the two indices. For instance, for the press coverage index most factors 
increase the probability that the index takes a value of 3, with a corresponding reduction in 
probability mass at either the average value of 2.5 or at 2, i.e. just one or two notches up. 
Comparing Figures 3 and 4, it becomes apparent that the effects for coverage in Figure 4 are 
more spiked than those for favorableness in Figure 3, i.e. that changes in the explanatory 
variables tend to affect only one outcome positively and one negatively for coverage, whereas 
the effect is more spread across outcomes for the favorableness index. For instance, with euro 
area inflation being above the 2% threshold, the probability of all favorableness index values 
above 0.5 is significantly reduced, whereas all negative outcomes, and even the neutral 0, 
become significantly more probable.  
 
 
7.   The Role of ECB Communication  
 
The results reported in the previous section show that media reports are responsive to efforts 
by the ECB to explain the motivation behind a given decision – in particular through its 
communication on the occasion of the Press Conference and in the inter-meeting period. This 
section analyses in more depth the scope as well as the limitations of these effects . 
 
A first important question is whether the acceptance of a given decision, which has been 
shown to depend on the economic environment and the nature of the decisions, is at the same 
time affected by the accompanying explanations. In particular, we have seen that policy 
surprises as well as periods of high euro area inflation trigger a more critical media reporting 
of ECB decisions. An interesting issue is to what extent the provision of information can lead 
to a better understanding of the public, and thus to a more favorable reporting. Table 7 
addresses this issue based on our proxy for the informational content of the press conference, 
the reaction of long-term bonds. We interpret a large movement of interest rates during the 
press conference as implying that the informational content has been considerable, although it 
should be stressed that not all relevant information necessarily moves markets. However, it is 
not necessarily equivalent to “good” communication from the central bank’s perspective. For 
instance, there might be cases where the market assessment does not need any updating, such 
that communication should aim to reconfirm the current level of interest rates and not to move 
them from their value prior to the press conference. In that sense, it is important to note that 
we consider our measure merely as a proxy for the informational content conveyed during the 
press conference, but not for the quality of the communication.  
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The first set of results analyses whether media reporting responds to communication during 
the press conference depending on whether a given monetary policy decision has been 
surprising to markets or not. There are four different possibilities. The information content of 
a Press Conference can either be large or small, and this can be the case for a decision that 
was either surprising or anticipated. The benchmark for comparison in this test is the case 
where the market reaction is small and the decision has been well anticipated. The results for 
favorableness show that press reporting is significantly more critical in only one case: with a 
small market reaction in the context of a surprising decision. This latter scenario (2) is 
actually not only different from the benchmark scenario, but also significantly different from 
the two other possibilities (1) and (3), as indicated by the tests of equality. What these results 
suggest is that a surprising decision, if sufficiently well motivated during the Press 
Conference, receives supportive reports in the media.  
 
A related test is conducted in the second set of results. In the preceding section, we had found 
that interest rate changes find a positive feedback in the press. Dissecting this finding further, 
it turns out that this originates from press conferences on days where interest rates were 
changed, and furthermore a large amount of informational content was conveyed. The impact 
on coverage is substantial in this case, as two enhancing factors are combined. There is more 
reporting about interest rate changes in general, and about press conferences with large 
accompanying market reactions, such that a combination of both factors in scenario (1) leads 
to more reporting than in any other scenario. 
 
Third, looking at the economic environment, if inflation exceeds 2%, reporting tends to be 
critical of ECB actions, regardless of the market reaction during the press conference. 
Moreover, there continues to be no effect of national inflation developments on the 
favorableness of reports in the national media, regardless of the communication on the 
occasion of the press conference. These results underline the media’s role as a critical 
observer of the independent central bank. 
 
Fourth, another way for the ECB to motivate and explain its decisions, is to employ inter-
meeting communication. Table 8 contains information on the role of inter-meeting 
communication depending on the monetary policy decision. In line with the results of Table 7, 
there is clear evidence that interest rate changes are seen positively by the press if they are 
prepared by complementary communication – if interest rates are changed, press reports are 
significantly more favorable if there has been a relatively large number of statements prior to 
the Governing Council meeting. 
 
Table 8  
 
Finally, Table 9 provides a more detailed analysis of policy decisions. If interest rates are 
changed, favorableness is unaffected by whether this change has been anticipated or came as a 
surprise. On the other hand, there is a large effect in case of unchanged interest rates. If the 
Governing Council decides to keep interest rates unchanged in the context of market 
expectations that rates will be changed, it will be faced with considerably more critical press 
reports than in all other scenarios.  
 
 
Table 9  
 
In summary, the findings indicate that efforts by the ECB to motivate, explain and prepare its 
decisions through the Press Conference and through inter-meeting communication, are 
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mirrored in the understanding and thus in the tone of subsequent press reports. However, the 
findings also underline clear limitations of this effect, as for instance a more critical 
discussion of ECB policy decisions prevails in the context of relatively high inflation. 
 
 
8.   Conclusions 
 
The dissemination of central bank communication through newspapers and mass media in 
general is important for a central bank, as it allows addressing the general public. Reaching 
the general public, and not only financial market participants, is important because it is the 
former whose inflation expectations eventually feed into the evolution of inflation through 
wage claims and savings, investment and consumption decisions, and thus affect how a 
central bank is able to achieve its policy objectives. This paper systematically assesses the 
coverage that the ECB receives in response to its monetary policy decisions in the 
international and national press. Based on a novel dataset that quantifies press coverage in the 
12 countries of the euro area and the international press based on 57 newspapers reaching 
back to 1999, the paper identifies a large number of determinants for both the favorableness 
(reflecting the understanding of a given policy decision) and the intensity of press coverage of 
ECB monetary policy decisions.  
 
The paper provides evidence of a link between favorableness and intensity, in the sense that 
stronger opinions expressed by journalists lead to more intense coverage. Furthermore, 
reporting intensifies in particular in the presence of critical views. The findings of the paper 
indicate that the assessment of ECB policy decisions in the media is influenced substantially 
by the nature of the decisions and the general economic environment. In particular, a less 
favorable reporting prevails if a decision is to some extent unanticipated, and if the most 
recent inflation figures stand above 2%, the ECB’s definition of price stability. 
 
In line with the hypothesis that clear communication will lead to a better understanding of 
policy decisions, and thus to a more favorable reporting in the media, the paper finds that the 
favorableness and the extent of media coverage are highly responsive to the type and content 
of ECB communication. For instance, we find that a policy surprise, which on average leads 
to more unfavorable reporting, receives as favorable a reporting by the media as a fully 
anticipated policy decision if it is sufficiently well explained during the press conference 
(measured through a proxy for its information content). A related finding suggests that the 
tone of the discussion turns more favorable, and thus reflects a better understanding in 
instances where the ECB releases relevant additional information beyond the regular 
economic and monetary analysis, such as the quarterly staff projections for future inflation 
and output growth. However, the empirical findings also underline that there are cases where 
a more critical discussion prevails, despite communication efforts to explain the motives 
behind a given decision. For instance, we find that the media reporting of ECB policy 
decisions is always more negative in tone when inflation is relatively high, even when 
communication is intense and the information content of press conferences is high. 
 
In a multi-country currency union like the euro area, where monetary policy is conducted with 
the aim to achieve price stability for the entire area, national media have an important role in 
making the central bank actions and its objectives understood by the national audiences, 
which might otherwise evaluate the common monetary policy from a national perspective. 
The findings in this paper suggest that there is no role for a national bias in the discussion of 
the ECB’s monetary policy decisions. On the contrary – in situations where the common 
monetary policy needs explaining more to a national audience, like in the case of deviations 
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of the national from the euro area inflation developments, the national media tend to write 
more extensively, but do not appear to have more biased views on the monetary policy 
decisions than the media in other countries. One interpretation is that the national media play 
an important role in transmitting the ECB’s policy intentions to their national audiences, and 
to contribute to a homogeneous understanding and perception of the role of the ECB. 
 
In sum, the paper has presented evidence that the media contributes to the transmission of the 
ECB’s communication in a meaningful fashion. Given the novelty of the approach and the 
issue addressed in this paper, several questions remain unanswered. This paper has looked at 
the case of the ECB. Comparing the extent of press coverage across central banks might 
enable us to shed light on the efficiency of the different communication practices of different 
central banks. Other possible extensions include a separate analysis of generalized 
newspapers and the financial press, a broader analysis including also regional newspapers, 
which often have a very high circulation, and as such the potential to reach a large audience, 
or of mass media other than the printed press. Finally, we have limited ourselves to an 
analysis of the transmission  of communication, leaving open the question how 
communication is actually received by the final addressee, the general public. We leave this 
for future research. 
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Notes: The chart plots the average value of the press indices for each Governing Council meeting.  
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Table 4: Favorableness as determinant for the extent of press coverage 
 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
Favorableness 0.010 0.108 -- -- -- -- -- --
Absolute Favorableness -- -- -- 1.229 *** 0.146 1.116 *** 0.172
Negative Favorableness -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.250 * 0.138
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects




Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R
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Table 5: Determinants of favorableness  
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.695 *** 0.206 -0.674 *** 0.232 -0.670 *** 0.230
ECB Rate Change 0.376 ** 0.170 0.317 * 0.182 0.301 * 0.181
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.828 * 0.426 1.124 *** 0.432 1.160 *** 0.432
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 0.852 *** 0.321 1.034 *** 0.316 1.082 *** 0.318
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.291 *** 0.051 0.299 *** 0.061 0.290 *** 0.060
Communication Frequency, Others 0.057 *** 0.019 0.065 *** 0.022 0.062 *** 0.022
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.204 0.213 -0.198 0.209
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- 0.525 *** 0.196 0.537 *** 0.197
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- 0.283 * 0.145 0.276 * 0.146
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% -0.375 *** 0.108 -0.524 *** 0.112 -0.498 *** 0.110
Industrial Production Above Average -0.028 0.097 0.001 0.096 -0.002 0.096
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- -0.037 0.163 -0.041 0.164
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- -9.126 7.818
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.082 0.113
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.222 0.147
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.064 * 0.033
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes
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Table 6: Determinants of the extent of press coverage 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
Favorableness Factors
Negative Favorableness 0.324 ** 0.142 0.363 ** 0.148 0.340 ** 0.145
Absolute Residual Favorableness 0.921 *** 0.197 0.943 *** 0.211 0.976 *** 0.212
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.240 0.166 -0.601 *** 0.194 -0.590 *** 0.186
ECB Rate Change 1.782 *** 0.156 1.977 *** 0.176 1.917 *** 0.166
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.723 * 0.406 1.249 *** 0.440 1.244 *** 0.414
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 3.175 *** 0.462 3.700 *** 0.493 3.493 *** 0.474
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.332 *** 0.061 0.170 *** 0.061 0.166 *** 0.061
Communication Frequency, Others 0.013 0.021 0.055 ** 0.024 0.053 ** 0.024
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.319 * 0.187 -0.332 * 0.182
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- -0.807 *** 0.202 -0.856 *** 0.201
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- -0.041 0.204 -0.047 0.203
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% 0.565 *** 0.102 0.501 *** 0.110 0.453 *** 0.108
Industrial Production Above Average 0.359 *** 0.092 0.456 *** 0.101 0.447 *** 0.098
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- 0.590 *** 0.156 0.581 *** 0.155
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- 23.916 *** 7.596
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.209 * 0.111
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.961 *** 0.153
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.080 *** 0.031
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes
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Table 7: The role of press conference communication 
 
Std. error (2) (3) Std. error (2) (3)
Policy surprise:
Large market reaction in PC & -0.152 0.233 0.003 0.542 0.001 0.191 0.000 0.416
policy surprise
Small market reaction in PC & -1.109 *** 0.319 0.001 -1.090 *** 0.233 0.000
policy surprise
Large market reaction in PC & 0.001 0.108 0.173 0.115
no policy surprise
Policy change:
Large market reaction in PC & 1.285 *** 0.282 0.000 0.000 2.593 *** 0.287 0.003 0.000
policy change
Small market reaction in PC & -0.184 0.198 0.771 1.805 *** 0.185 0.000
policy change
Large market reaction in PC & -0.127 0.110 0.210 * 0.112
no policy change
Euro area inflation:
Large market reaction in PC & -0.341 ** 0.163 0.234 0.002 0.780 *** 0.176 0.043 0.015
EA inflation above 2%
Small market reaction in PC & -0.494 *** 0.160 0.000 0.522 *** 0.159 0.313
EA inflation above 2%
Large market reaction in PC & 0.184 0.193 0.377 * 0.199
EA inflation below 2%
Country-specific inflation:
Large market reaction in PC & 0.108 0.170 0.221 0.829 0.539 *** 0.153 0.089 0.171
large country inflation diff. from EA 
Small market reaction in PC & -0.100 0.120 0.113 0.267 * 0.124 0.746
large country inflation diff. from EA 
Large market reaction in PC & 0.135 0.129 0.316 ** 0.127
small country inflation diff. from EA 
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes
























Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
standard errors. Numbers for tests of equality denote p-values; significant results at the 10% level are shown in bold. 
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Table 8: Frequency of inter-meeting communication and monetary policy changes 
 
Std. error (2) (3) Std. error (2) (3)
High frequency & 0.371 * 0.216 0.001 0.073 2.427 *** 0.223 0.000 0.000
policy change
Low frequency & -0.682 ** 0.308 0.019 1.054 *** 0.262 0.001
policy change
High frequency & 0.013 0.122 0.276 ** 0.130
no policy change
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes




Favorableness of Press Coverage Extent of Press Coverage









Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
standard errors. Numbers for tests of equality denote p-values; significant results at the 10% level are shown in bold. 
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Table 9: Monetary policy surprises and monetary policy changes 
 
Std. error (2) (3) Std. error (2) (3)
Policy change & -0.318 0.215 0.106 0.094 1.140 *** 0.177 0.000 0.000
policy surprise
Policy change & 0.174 0.221 0.004 2.384 *** 0.209 0.000
no policy surprise
No policy change & -0.900 *** 0.322 0.160 0.241
policy surprise
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes












Favorableness of Press Coverage Extent of Press Coverage
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
standard errors. Numbers for tests of equality denote p-values; significant results at the 10% level are shown in bold. 
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Table A1: Determinants of favorableness, random effects model 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.680 *** 0.172 -0.664 *** 0.192 -0.669 *** 0.192
ECB Rate Change 0.350 ** 0.145 0.309 ** 0.155 0.301 * 0.155
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.729 * 0.410 1.143 *** 0.435 1.160 *** 0.436
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 0.865 ** 0.376 1.080 *** 0.382 1.082 *** 0.382
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.269 *** 0.052 0.293 *** 0.065 0.290 *** 0.065
Communication Frequency, Others 0.052 ** 0.022 0.064 *** 0.024 0.062 *** 0.024
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.218 0.193 -0.198 0.193
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- 0.529 ** 0.218 0.537 ** 0.218
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- 0.278 0.243 0.275 0.243
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% -0.383 *** 0.108 -0.515 *** 0.116 -0.498 *** 0.117
Industrial Production Above Average -0.047 0.101 0.011 0.106 -0.002 0.106
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- -0.028 0.147 -0.041 0.147
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- -9.124 7.727
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.082 0.113
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.222 0.160
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.064 ** 0.032
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes













Model (1) Model (2)
Yes
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
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Table A2: Determinants of the extent of press coverage, random effects model 
 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
Favorableness Factors
Negative Favorableness 0.287 ** 0.137 0.352 ** 0.141 0.313 ** 0.142
Absolute Residual Favorableness 0.894 *** 0.175 0.890 *** 0.184 0.939 *** 0.186
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.222 0.173 -0.592 *** 0.193 -0.582 *** 0.194
ECB Rate Change 1.773 *** 0.159 1.961 *** 0.171 1.958 *** 0.172
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.764 * 0.400 1.242 *** 0.422 1.255 *** 0.422
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 3.151 *** 0.400 3.629 *** 0.419 3.612 *** 0.418
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.329 *** 0.051 0.164 *** 0.062 0.165 *** 0.062
Communication Frequency, Others 0.010 0.020 0.056 ** 0.023 0.052 ** 0.023
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.342 * 0.185 -0.324 * 0.185
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- -0.815 *** 0.210 -0.840 *** 0.210
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- -0.038 0.219 -0.050 0.219
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% 0.553 *** 0.105 0.451 *** 0.111 0.479 *** 0.112
Industrial Production Above Average 0.359 *** 0.096 0.435 *** 0.100 0.446 *** 0.100
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- 0.578 *** 0.148 0.594 *** 0.149
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- 9.994 8.041
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.265 ** 0.108
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.920 *** 0.155
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.013 0.035
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes
















Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
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Table A3: Determinants of favorableness, OLS 
 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.268 *** 0.083 -0.255 *** 0.092 -0.255 *** 0.091
ECB Rate Change 0.146 ** 0.069 0.119 0.073 0.115 0.072
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.364 ** 0.169 0.457 *** 0.164 0.470 *** 0.165
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 0.349 ** 0.154 0.402 *** 0.146 0.420 *** 0.149
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.116 *** 0.021 0.111 *** 0.025 0.108 *** 0.024
Communication Frequency, Others 0.024 *** 0.007 0.026 *** 0.008 0.025 *** 0.008
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.059 0.084 -0.057 0.082
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- 0.173 ** 0.080 0.181 ** 0.080
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- 0.105 * 0.054 0.102 * 0.054
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% -0.145 *** 0.042 -0.195 *** 0.043 -0.187 *** 0.042
Industrial Production Above Average -0.008 0.037 0.003 0.037 0.001 0.036
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- -0.010 0.066 -0.011 0.066
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- -3.765 3.019
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.033 0.043
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.098 * 0.056
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.024 * 0.013
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes













Model (1) Model (2)
Yes
Yes Yes
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Table A4: Determinants of the extent of press coverage, OLS 
 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
Favorableness Factors
Negative Favorableness 0.170 ** 0.074 0.178 ** 0.072 0.167 ** 0.071
Absolute Residual Favorableness 0.426 *** 0.103 0.382 *** 0.102 0.415 *** 0.104
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.103 0.085 -0.249 *** 0.094 -0.250 *** 0.091
ECB Rate Change 0.878 *** 0.074 0.891 *** 0.078 0.885 *** 0.074
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.348 0.218 0.571 *** 0.221 0.580 *** 0.213
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 1.501 *** 0.192 1.561 *** 0.188 1.527 *** 0.186
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.167 *** 0.032 0.088 *** 0.030 0.087 *** 0.031
Communication Frequency, Others 0.005 0.012 0.021 * 0.013 0.020 0.013
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.142 0.096 -0.149 0.095
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- -0.351 *** 0.108 -0.385 *** 0.109
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- -0.033 0.114 -0.035 0.116
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% 0.301 *** 0.058 0.263 *** 0.059 0.248 *** 0.060
Industrial Production Above Average 0.185 *** 0.051 0.224 *** 0.052 0.226 *** 0.052
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- 0.254 *** 0.075 0.258 *** 0.076
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- 11.682 *** 3.889
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.107 * 0.058
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.506 *** 0.079
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.052 *** 0.016
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes
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Table A5: Determinants of favorableness, excluding international press 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.643 *** 0.214 -0.654 *** 0.240 -0.648 *** 0.238
ECB Rate Change 0.364 ** 0.174 0.329 * 0.188 0.307 0.188
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.808 * 0.449 1.146 ** 0.452 1.177 *** 0.453
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 0.842 *** 0.322 1.022 *** 0.321 1.068 *** 0.325
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.321 *** 0.053 0.340 *** 0.063 0.327 *** 0.062
Communication Frequency, Others 0.062 *** 0.020 0.069 *** 0.023 0.067 *** 0.022
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.240 0.217 -0.233 0.214
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- 0.468 ** 0.205 0.495 ** 0.210
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- 0.319 ** 0.154 0.310 ** 0.154
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% -0.381 *** 0.114 -0.519 *** 0.116 -0.479 *** 0.114
Industrial Production Above Average -0.033 0.101 -0.001 0.101 0.000 0.100
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- -0.043 0.170 -0.038 0.170
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- -11.875 8.122
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.037 0.137
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.195 0.181
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.059 0.038
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes




Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R
2



























Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
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Table A6: Determinants of the extent of press coverage, excluding international press 
 
 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
Favorableness Factors
Negative Favorableness 0.250 * 0.146 0.269 * 0.151 0.239 0.148
Absolute Residual Favorableness 0.959 *** 0.201 1.007 *** 0.214 1.039 *** 0.213
ECB's Policy Decisions & Communication Tools
Policy Decisions
ECB Monetary Policy Surprise -0.240 0.170 -0.560 *** 0.198 -0.540 *** 0.191
ECB Rate Change 1.809 *** 0.159 1.988 *** 0.181 1.926 *** 0.172
Meeting-Day Communication
Market Reaction During Press Conference 0.673 0.424 1.153 ** 0.460 1.140 *** 0.436
Meeting Outside Frankfurt 3.137 *** 0.458 3.636 *** 0.489 3.413 *** 0.472
Inter-Meeting Communication 
Communication Frequency, President 0.317 *** 0.063 0.150 ** 0.062 0.144 ** 0.061
Communication Frequency, Others 0.009 0.022 0.049 * 0.025 0.046 * 0.025
Other Communication 
Clarification of the ECB Strategy -- -- -- -0.238 0.192 -0.252 0.186
Release of Reference Value of M3 Growth -- -- -- -0.830 *** 0.211 -0.883 *** 0.209
Release of Staff Projections -- -- -- -0.044 0.214 -0.056 0.210
Economic environment
Euro Area Macro Conditions
Inflation Above 2% 0.566 *** 0.106 0.514 *** 0.112 0.460 *** 0.111
Industrial Production Above Average 0.341 *** 0.095 0.429 *** 0.104 0.425 *** 0.102
Federal Reserve
Fed Rate Change -- -- -- 0.558 *** 0.159 0.548 *** 0.158
Country-Specific Conditions
Absolute National Inflation Differential -- -- -- -- -- -- 21.937 *** 7.782
National Executive Board Member -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.136 0.130
Large Country -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.071 *** 0.189
National Inflation Since 1950 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.104 *** 0.037
Controls for newspaper coverage
Controls for expert effects
Controls for special events and changes




Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R
2


























Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. Numbers in italics are 
standard errors.  
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